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In recent years it has become fashionable for legal academics to conceive
of problems in American election law as ones concerning regulation of the
political marketplace as opposed to infringements on constitutionally guar-
anteed individual or associational rights.1 This shift in scholarly attention
derives from several sources. First, although new challenges such as increased
disfranchisement of felons and restrictive voter identification provisions have
emerged, most of the classic barriers to participation have been replaced with
complicated and subtle strategies dedicated to maintaining incumbent parties
and officeholders in their current positions of power. Second, while often
phrased in the language of individual rights derived from earlier cases, the
alleged harm these new strategies cause is broadly shared and systemic (a
harm to the “polity”), as opposed to discrete and targeted. The constitutional
materiel used to redress government infringements of individual political
rights, the argument goes, is ill-suited to the task of regulating political
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monopolies or duopolies or of checking self-serving moves by incumbents.
Finally, unprecedented parity in membership of the national political parties,
ideological polarization among officeholders, and remarkable rates of incum-
bent reelection have given rise to fears that self-serving election laws have
made the electoral system unresponsive and unrepresentative of the underly-
ing electorate. Or, even if the law is not responsible, both statutes and judge-
made constitutional law might help correct these problems.
The task of this chapter is to identify the problem of diminished political
competition, describe the relevant legal analogies concerning regulation of
economic competition, and explain how the law shapes the competitive envi-
ronment for elections. I also detail how Supreme Court justices have some-
times tried to incorporate competitiveness concerns into their election law
decisions in cases concerning ballot access, redistricting, campaign finance,
party reform, and term limits. For the most part, constitutional law proves to
be both a blunt and a coarse instrument for addressing excesses of partisan
greed or self-interest, but justices of varying ideological leanings have invoked
such concerns (usually in dissent) to highlight why one or another election
law violates the Constitution.
The Definition, Purpose and Tradeoffs 
of Electoral Competition  
Although the other chapters in this volume do a good job of assessing the
level of competition in American elections, it is worth spending a few para-
graphs here identifying the legally relevant measures of competition. The spe-
cific concerns of political scientists may differ considerably from those of
lawyers and judges, though, and the law may be able to shape the competitive
environment in some respects, but not others. Furthermore, if judges are to
create or administer a legal regime with promoting competition as a guide-
post, we need to know how better to define such a goal.
Leaving aside for the moment the normative question as to whether com-
petition is an inherent good, and the empirical questions as to whether elec-
tions today are, in fact, uniquely uncompetitive and what the causes of the
lack of competitiveness might be, we can easily identify the features of an
uncompetitive electoral system. The following constitutes a nonexhaustive
list:
—Rates of contestation: How many races go uncontested and how many
parties and candidates tend to appear on the primary and general election
ballot?
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—Incumbent reelection rates: How often do incumbents get reelected?
How much of an electoral advantage do incumbents have over challengers? 
—Actual or expected margins of victory: Do winners usually win by a
lot? What is the expected vote share of the candidates competing in a given
election?
—Rates of turnover and length of time in office: How often do open seats
materialize? How stable is the membership in the legislature from one elec-
tion to the next? What is the average length of tenure in office?
—Changes in control of government: How likely or frequently is there a
change in which party controls the legislature or government?
Different election laws will have different competition-related effects, and
maximizing competitiveness along one dimension might diminish it on
another. Partisan gerrymanders may decrease competition for control of leg-
islative chambers, for example, but they may increase the competitiveness of
many individual districts where the majority party has spread its supporters
too thin. Term limits, almost by definition, will lead to greater turnover in
government, but may lead to less contestation and higher margins of victory
in the years when incumbents run for reelection because challengers will bide
their time until the seat opens up.
Not only should we be aware of the different dimensions of political com-
petition in our assessment of legal strategies to increase them, but we should
acknowledge that political competition is primarily a means to other ends:
namely, greater accountability, responsiveness, representation, and participa-
tion in government. Competition fosters greater accountability, the argument
goes, by keeping legislators honest with the omnipresent threat that they
might lose their jobs. It also makes elections meaningful (responsive) by
translating shifts in voter preferences into shifts in the partisan competition
of the legislature. Moreover, others argue that competitive districts lead to less
bias or polarization in the legislature: they maintain that if districts are more
balanced politically then their representatives will be more moderate than if
the districts are heavily skewed toward one or the other party.2 Likewise, in
such districts perhaps turnout will increase as parties and candidates put
greater effort into mobilizing voters, who also might feel their vote has more
value than in a district where the victor is all but assured.
Whether electoral competition produces the alleged benefits of respon-
siveness, accountability, representation, and participation is a matter of
empirical debate, as are the alleged tradeoffs from a pro-competition election
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law regime. Critics point to the fact that a singular focus on increasing com-
petitiveness could lead to a very unrepresentative legislature, if, for example,
small shifts in voter preferences in many evenly split districts led to heavy
overrepresentation of the dominant party in the legislature.3 Just as a redis-
tricting plan filled with noncompetitive districts could be biased in favor of
the political extremes, so too competitive districts could be biased in favor of
the moderate median voter. Finally, although foreordained, noncompetitive
elections, in theory, might alienate voters who think their vote does not mat-
ter, the same could be true with respect to competitive election campaigns
with their higher costs and acrimony and with their guarantee that close to
half of the electorate will have voted for the loser.
Importing Competition from Corporate Law into Election Law 
The above description of the concept, benefits, and tradeoffs of competition
is useful in assessing the constitutional importance (if any) of political com-
petition. On the one hand, the Constitution is silent on the topic of electoral
competition, as it presupposes that elections and the franchise can be largely
regulated by state legislatures and Congress.4 On the other hand, article 4,
section 4 of the Constitution provides that “the United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” and the
notion that totally uncompetitive elections might suggest something less than
republicanism does not constitute a radical idea. Although the courts have
not enforced that constitutional command, they have found other avenues—
principally in the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—to derive a right to vote and to delineate permissi-
ble and impermissible forms of political regulation. Both of those provisions,
as discussed further in the cases in the next section, establish norms against
unreasonable treatment in favor of one group, association, or set of ideas to
the detriment of another. Those who would work within the current consti-
tutional doctrine to further judicial innovations in the direction of greater
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political competition view self-serving election laws as equal to any others
that reinforce the position of the already powerful or limit the permissible
scope of debate.5
Rather than obsessing over the textual constitutional hook for a political
markets theory of election law, the new generation of scholarship advocating
this view focuses on analogies to corporate law. In particular, Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes’s seminal article that redirected the focus of
the legal academy toward barriers to electoral competition attempted to find
analogies in antitrust law and the law governing the market for corporate
control.6 In the economic sphere, these two bodies of law serve to check
actions by firms to diminish competition for consumers and actions by man-
agers to insulate themselves from replacement. In both contexts the bad
behavior that judicial action restrains concerns an abuse of economic power
to the detriment of some group (consumers, shareholders, competitors) for
whom vigorous competition otherwise would be expected to provide bene-
fits (lower-priced, high-quality products or shares of greater value).
The analogy to antitrust is straightforward: just as a firm can strategize to
become an economic monopolist or a set of firms can behave like a cartel, so
can one or two parties behave in ways to diminish political competition.
Whereas in the economic sphere competition keeps firms honest by forcing
them to strive toward lower prices and better quality in order to win over con-
sumers, in the political realm competition could force parties and officehold-
ers to be honest—that is, not to stray too far from the median voter or not to
deliver a low-quality “product” (for example, unresponsive legislators or poor
constituent service). Political monopolies or duopolies, under this view, lead
to unrepresentative and unresponsive government as reflected in politicians
who are “out of touch” and legislatures that ignore shifts in voter preferences.
The analogy to the market for corporate control comes from the identifi-
cation of a similar problem: incumbents’ use of their lawmaking or rule-
writing power to insulate themselves from competition that might result in
their losing their jobs. In the case of a typical “poison pill,” directors seeking
to prevent a takeover will bind a corporation into agreements that then make
the corporation less attractive to outsiders who may be bidding for control.
As a result, the shareholders lose the potential benefit in an increased share
price that would inure to them if competition for control of the corporation
were unfettered.
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So too with politics, the argument goes. Incumbent politicians can write
election laws to diminish the chance that viable competitors will emerge and
to ensure that they do not lose their jobs. For those who urge it, judicial
action in both spheres prevents some breach of a duty of loyalty to share-
holders or constituents when the managers or incumbents place their per-
sonal interest over the firm’s or public’s interest. Judicial oversight can check
abuses of power by those in charge by removing conflicts of interest, and by
ensuring that fidelity to one’s faction or firm does not lead to monopoly pol-
itics or political market breakdown.
This thumbnail sketch of the relevant corporate law analogies is necessar-
ily a caricature of what are complicated and developing concepts in a vast
area of law. An active theoretical and empirical debate exists over what con-
stitutes a competitive market or whether “poison pills” actually harm share-
holders in the short or long run. Moreover, the analogy to politics fits uncom-
fortably: we do not have a metric akin to price with which to measure the
relative desirability of government policy to constituents. We also do not have
many market analogies that produce natural duopolies similar to those pro-
duced by single-member election districts operating under plurality-based
rules. Even so, conceptualizing election law problems as problems of compe-
tition, as opposed to group or individual rights, might lead to different judi-
cial policymaking, or at least to a redefinition of the nature of the problem lit-
igation in this arena is designed to remedy.
How the Law Shapes the Competitive Environment 
Incumbent parties and officeholders can use election law in any number of ways
to hobble the competitive position of outsiders. They can raise the barriers to
entry, skew or divide up the relevant market, or sabotage competitors’ efforts to
win over voters. Judges are in the best position to regulate anticompetitive
behavior, it is thought, because lawmakers will be unwilling to rewrite the rules
in ways that threaten their own positions of power. Just as they can best protect
powerless political minorities who have no chance of gaining control of govern-
ment, judges are also institutionally situated to prevent the political foxes from
guarding the henhouse and to clear the “channels of political change.”7 Despite
the ominous predictions of dissenters, our experience with the one-person, one-
vote cases demonstrates that the courts, on occasion, can break political stran-
gleholds and do so without losing credibility or inviting backlash.
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As difficult as it might be for judges to assess competitive economic mar-
kets, though, regulating or promoting political competition presents greater
challenges given the few articulable constitutional standards available. As
mentioned, there is no agreed upon indicator for political market breakdown
or any obvious way to prevent it. In many, if not most, election law contexts a
court adopting the political markets approach can do no better than declare
that those in charge simply went too far, were too greedy, or were too hostile
to their opponents. In the case law concerning ballot access, redistricting,
campaign finance, term limits, and regulation of party primaries, the Supreme
Court has not identified incumbent protection—whether of individual office-
holders or dominant parties—as an impermissible motivation. Indeed, in sev-
eral contexts it has specifically given its blessing to anticompetitive state action
in the election law arena.
Whether courts intend it or not, judicial decisions shape the environment
for electoral competition. Even if they do not reference competitiveness con-
cerns explicitly, the courts’ decisions whether and how to be involved in a
domain of election law affect the strategies of the actors seeking to immunize
themselves from competition. Involvement by the judiciary, whether justi-
fied under the First and Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise, constrains the
available options for parties and politicians seeking to entrench themselves or
hobble their competitors. Moreover, litigation over election laws has become
part of the competition for office and power itself, as lawyers fight out the
ground rules for how and when votes will matter.
What follows in the remainder of this chapter is a cataloguing of the case
law that bears on the topic of electoral competition, even though majority
opinions rarely analyze an issue from a political markets perspective. With
that said, one can see flickers of the competitiveness rationale in the debates
among the justices in these cases, even if the argument rarely wins over a
majority. For each topic, I also try to sketch out the proposals often made to
judges and legislatures to increase electoral competition.
Ballot Access 
Through regulation of the number of parties or candidates appearing on
the ballot, those with the power to write electoral rules can raise the barriers
to entry for new participants in the electoral system. Competition in this
realm focuses on levels of (or at least the potential for) contestation. A true
antitrust approach to politics would seek to ensure that enough parties and
candidates appear on the ballot, such that elections actually reflect voter
demand instead of being the product of the artificial constraints imposed by
COMPETITION IN AMERICAN ELECTION LAW 177
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the dominant parties crafting the law. Perhaps because it provides the best
analogy to antitrust, ballot access law is the only arena of election law where
the Supreme Court has explicitly analyzed the problem from the standpoint
of its anticompetitive effects. However, because it has clung to available doc-
trine emphasizing competition in the marketplace of ideas as opposed to
competition for office per se, the marketlike language the Court employs sup-
ports a metaphor more than it pushes a theory of democracy.
Restrictions on ballot access endanger First Amendment freedoms of
speech and association when they curtail a voter’s ability to express his pref-
erence on the ballot and associate with the candidate of his choosing. More-
over, the ballot access rules can chill the participation of parties and candi-
dates in campaigns, thereby narrowing the scope of political debate, and as
such the Court has borrowed liberally from First Amendment precedent
emphasizing the importance of a marketplace of ideas. Of course, ballots are
not public forums, and the First Amendment does not require that the num-
ber of “speakers” allowed access to the ballot be comparable to that allowed
on the Boston Commons. Therefore, the Court is always confronted with the
task of balancing between the state’s interests in preserving order and pre-
venting confusion and the party, voter, and candidate’s right to express them-
selves in the campaign and on the ballot.
It is worth excerpting at length the few cases that place the market
metaphor front and center. Williams v. Rhodes, which struck down a 15 per-
cent signature requirement for minor parties attempting to get on the Ohio
presidential ballot, clarified that ballot regulations favoring the Democratic
and Republican parties, in particular, raise serious constitutional questions:
“There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent
monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against them. Competition
in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and
of the First Amendment freedoms.”8 Anderson v. Celebrezze, which struck
down early filing deadlines that prevented independent candidate John
Anderson from getting on the Ohio ballot in 1980, sounded a similar theme:
By limiting the opportunities of independent-minded voters to associ-
ate in the electoral arena to enhance their political effectiveness as a
group, such restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in
the marketplace of ideas. Historically political figures outside the two
major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs;
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many of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way
into the political mainstream. In short, the primary values protected by
the First Amendment—“a profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open,”—are served when election campaigns are not monopo-
lized by the existing political parties.9
For all the flowery talk about competition among candidates, parties, and
ideas, however, these early signals of an aggressive judicial role in eliminating
barriers to entry have not carried the analogy too far. In fact, while Williams
v. Rhodes may stand for the proposition that ballot regulations cannot advan-
tage the Democratic and Republican parties, in particular, Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, makes clear that such laws can be biased in favor of a
two-party system.10 In striking down Minnesota’s ban on fusion candidacies,
which prohibited a candidate from being the nominee of more than one
political party, the Court explained: “[T]he States’ interest [in political stabil-
ity] permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in prac-
tice, favor the traditional two-party system, and that temper the destabilizing
effects of party-splintering and excessive factionalism. The Constitution per-
mits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served
through a healthy two-party system.” In other words, just as the single-
member district system should not raise judicial eyebrows because of its bias
in favor of two parties, so too regulations of the ballot can naturally be biased
in favor of a duopoly. Of course, the practical effect of such a rule is to bias the
system both in favor of two parties in the abstract and in favor of the current
two parties in control.
While paying lip service to the notion that the barriers to political market
entry should not be too high, the Supreme Court has stressed that there is no
“litmus-paper test” that can separate valid from invalid ballot access restric-
tions.11 Indeed, one cannot avoid a rule of decision in these cases that avoids
a totality-of-the-circumstances type of analysis. The actual “test,” if one can
call it that, applied in such cases is the following:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Four-
teenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the “character and
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magnitude” of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights
against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider
the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden necessary.
Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be nar-
rowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens,
however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s “important regulatory
interests” will usually be enough to justify “reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions.”12
All of the work in this analysis is done at the front end with the decision con-
cerning whether the burdens imposed are severe. Rarely, if ever, will a court
determine a severe burden to be constitutional or a nonsevere burden to be
unconstitutional. The severity of the burden, though, is on rights of expres-
sion and association, not on the competitive position of minor parties. A bal-
lot access regime that protects minor parties’ ability to get their message out
will usually be upheld, despite the fact that it ensures they will not compete
effectively against the two major parties. This is true even when the context is
a complete ban on write-in voting, which dissenters viewed as entrenching a
single party in office.13
For the most part, a similar type of analysis is at work whenever courts
consider barriers to entry by minor parties or independent candidates: for
example, in the context of candidate debates or receipt of public funding.14
Administrative necessities, scarce resources (whether ballot positions, time
in a debate, or the amount of money to be distributed), and a desire to draw
the line somewhere lead inevitably to context-specific decisions about how
burdensome or necessary the regulations are. In general, when it presents
itself, the competition argument is not so much about electoral competition
as it is about promoting the marketplace of ideas, with marginal candidates
and parties tolerated but removed as threats to the two parties’ hegemony.
It is also somewhat unclear how a political antitrust approach would dif-
fer from the one currently in place. A presidential system with single-member
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districts and plurality voting rules is biased in favor of two parties. In such a
system, minor parties and independent candidates pose little threat of
replacement and have claimed only sporadic and localized electoral successes.
Their competition with the major-party candidates manifests itself in their
offering ideas that influence the campaigns and incumbents’ policies (as
already recognized in the jurisprudence) and in the threat they pose from
spoiling the election (à la Nader in the 2000 election). At most, a jurispru-
dence focused on the value of contestation would look askance at those states
(such as Florida, Georgia, Arkansas, and West Virginia) that had fewer than
two candidates, on average, appearing on ballots for the 2004 elections to the
House of Representatives.15 In the end, though, adopting such an approach
would do little more than establish a rule that ballot access requirements can-
not be so high as to make contestation unlikely.
Redistricting 
The Texas redistricting controversy, as well as failed redistricting reform
initiatives in Ohio and California, has placed redistricting at the top of the
reform agenda.16 The grab bag of problems that proposed reforms (either
judicial or legislative) target are some subset of those described above—low
turnover, few high-quality challengers, high victory margins, low responsive-
ness, heavy bias, and increasing polarization. The spate of gerrymandering in
the 2000 round, followed as it was by uncompetitive elections in many House
districts and biased delegations in several states, has caused many to blame
redistricting for one or another democratic malady or at least to look to redis-
tricting reform as a potential cure.17
Despite the urgings of plaintiffs and academics, thus far the political mar-
kets approach has not won over a majority of the Court in the gerrymander-
ing cases. Indeed, while some dissenting justices may mention “competition,”
for the most part, the Court has been preoccupied with issues of representa-
tion and bias. Such is the case when the Court has considered either partisan
gerrymanders or bipartisan gerrymanders. The injury, to the extent that one
exists and has remained unremedied, is conceived as underrepresentation or
the dilution of a group’s votes.
Bipartisan and Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders. Although complaints
against gerrymandering take many forms, those who worry about intra-
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district competition focus on districting plans that divide the state into safe
Republican and Democratic enclaves or otherwise protect incumbents from
effective challengers.18 As noted above, this critique usually dovetails with a
concern about polarization, since it is presumed that politically homoge-
neous districts will produce representatives farther away from the median
voter in the given state. Not only has the Supreme Court failed to entertain
this critique; it has all but blessed incumbent protection as a legitimate state
interest and bipartisan gerrymanders as furthering a rational policy of pro-
portional representation.
With respect to bipartisan gerrymanders, the only case directly on point is
Gaffney v. Cummings.19 There the Court upheld a plan that divided the state
into safe Democratic and Republican strongholds in an effort to create a leg-
islature that mirrored the partisan balance in the state. Doing so was not only
constitutionally permissible but arguably desirable. The Court explained that
“judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength
and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.”20 Because it assessed
the potential constitutional injury solely in terms of representation in the leg-
islature rather than competition within the district, the Court found no prob-
lem with bipartisan gerrymandering.
In other contexts, the Court has even gone so far as to declare incumbent
protection to be a legitimate (and traditional) districting principle.21 In fact,
protection of incumbents22 or the creation of a safe district for a party23 can
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be a defense to an otherwise unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In other
words, one way for a jurisdiction to defend a district that might raise con-
cerns because it used race predominantly would be to argue that it was drawn
to be a safe Democratic district or one that avoids the pairing of two incum-
bents. Far from suggesting constitutional liability because of its anticompet-
itive effect, incumbent protection could be the legal saving grace of a district.
Partisan Gerrymanders. Given the voluminous discussion and briefing con-
nected to the two high-profile cases of partisan gerrymandering the Supreme
Court has considered in the past four years, precious little remains to be said
about the jurisprudential difficulties such cases present. From a political mar-
kets approach, one would consider partisan gerrymanders to be a means
through which the party in control of the legislature undercuts the competi-
tive position of the “out” party that otherwise might be in a better position to
win a greater number of seats and perhaps control of the legislature. In prac-
tice, dominant parties tamper with the market for legislative control by pack-
ing their opponents into a few safe districts (packing), spreading their sup-
porters efficiently (cracking), and pairing incumbents so as to favor the party
in power (kidnapping). Some partisan gerrymanders do not look character-
istically different from bipartisan gerrymanders, since shoring up the partisan
balance of the status quo may be the most efficient strategy for insulating the
dominant party from challenge.
Dissenters in the recent case concerning a challenge to Pennsylvania’s con-
gressional districts, Vieth v. Jubelirer, have appeared concerned about the use
of partisan gerrymanders to entrench political minorities and hinder politi-
cal competition.24 As Justice Souter’s dissent explained: “the Court’s job must
be to identify clues, as objective as we can make them, indicating that parti-
san competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”25 While all those
who would provide a judicial check on gerrymandering worry about the bias
such gerrymanders produce, Justice Stephen Breyer has focused on the pos-
sibility that through gerrymandering a minority party might be able to
entrench itself such that any change in the partisan preferences of the elec-
torate would not translate into electoral risk. This argument is best suited to
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redistricting of the state legislature, as opposed to Congress, since entrench-
ment only really occurs when a majority party draws its own district lines,
rather than those of the congressional delegation it sends to Washington.26
Moreover, such concerns are less relevant to gerrymanders like that which
occurred in 2003 in Texas where the majority increases its representation as
opposed to a minority insulating itself from challenge. Nevertheless, drawing
on the concerns that motivated the Court to enter the political thicket with
the one-person, one-vote rule, Breyer warns of the “unjustified use of politi-
cal factors to entrench a minority in power.” Just as representatives from rural
districts maintained their power by leaving century-old district lines in place,
parties that redraw lines to insulate themselves from challenges to their hege-
mony should violate the Equal Protection Clause.
For the moment (which is to say, until the Court renders a decision in the
Texas case), claims of partisan gerrymandering remain justiciable but unsuc-
cessful. The absence of any judicially administrable standards has convinced
four justices that courts should remove themselves completely from this arena.
Entrenchment in this realm usually does not present a constitutionally cogniz-
able concern, although unlike protection of specific incumbents, no one has
described it as a legitimate interest.27 Because the success of an entrenchment
strategy is only recognizable after the fact—that is, after the gerrymander pro-
duces warped results over the course of several elections—and because the line
between entrenchment strategies and political skill may be hard to discern, the
Court has not embraced an approach to districting that would prevent domi-
nant parties from insulating themselves from competition.
Plenty such judicial decision rules exist, however. In fact, each of the three
Vieth dissents proffered its own standard for excessive partisan gerryman-
dering, and all of them differed from the standards suggested by the plaintiffs
in that case or established by the previous precedent.28 For the most part, all
of those standards attempted to establish criteria as to when partisanship had
infected the redistricting process too much, according to irregularities of
process, intentions of the line-drawers, strangeness of the districts, or the dis-
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proportionality of results. In the recent Texas gerrymandering case, a group
of political scientists has urged the Court to adopt a rule of “partisan sym-
metry,” which would require redistricting plans to treat each party equally
with respect to the propensity of shifts in voter preferences to be reflected in
shifts in legislative composition.29
In addition to these standards urged in the context of the partisan gerry-
mandering cases, reformers have proposed a variety of legislative and judi-
cial remedies for the anticompetitive effects of gerrymandering. The most
extreme may be to mandate—either by statute or judicial decree—a require-
ment that districts be drawn with the goal of increasing competition. Ari-
zona does so in its constitution. In theory, judges could interpret such a
requirement in the U.S. Constitution, striking down districting plans unless
a certain share of districts have a partisan balance that suggests the election
will be competitive. (Again, of course, the questions are what constitutes a
competitive district, how many districts need to be competitive, what
lengths one should go to contort a state so that districts can be competitive,
and so forth.) Somewhat less drastic would be a requirement akin to that
governing the redistricting process in Iowa, which forbids partisanship or
incumbency to be taken into account in the redistricting process. Ignoring
such factors (or requiring that only considerations such as compactness and
respect for political subdivision lines influence redistricting) does not nec-
essarily lead to greater competition, especially in the many states with stark
political segregation. However, such requirements, if followed and enforced,
at least prevent the use of political criteria in the furtherance of a noncom-
petitive districting plan.
In addition to these substantive proposals, procedural requirements en-
forced by judges or inserted into statutes could mute the anticompetitive ten-
dencies of politicians drawing their own districts. One option that Samuel
Issacharoff has advocated is for judges to enforce a prophylactic rule deeming
any redistricting conducted by self-interested officials to be unconstitutional.30
Many states indeed conduct redistricting through commissions, although such
institutions vary considerably in their degree of insulation from political pres-
sures. The proposed but ultimately defeated initiatives in Ohio and California
would have had retired judges appoint redistricting officials or draw the lines
themselves. Others would urge redistricting by a commission made up of ordi-
nary citizens selected through some aspirational nonpartisan process.
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As we have seen in the recent cases and failed initiatives, redistricting
reform is easier said than done. Judges cannot agree on when partisan con-
cerns have too much influence over the line-drawing process, and voters, who
would supposedly benefit from such measures, are not exactly enthusiastic
about recent reform proposals. Without action by the judiciary or through
direct democracy, though, redistricting reform will be left to the politicians
who have the least incentive to change the process.
Campaign Finance Regulations 
Regulation of campaign finance presents an interesting problem for advo-
cates of a market approach to election law regulation. Antitrust- or anti-
entrenchment-style arguments concerning the effect of the campaign finance
regime on incumbents and challengers are thrown about by both reformers
and their opponents. When the cases come to the Court, however, a majority
has yet to endorse this approach, relying instead on the formulaic arguments
about the speech and associational interests campaign finance regulations
present. For the most part, the Court upholds limits on contributions and
strikes down limits on expenditures (except in the special context of corpo-
rate or union electioneering) based on the gravity of the speech interests
implicated by the restrictions. Once again, however, dissenters who urge
greater judicial scrutiny of the anticompetitive effects of these types of elec-
tion laws have focused on the relative benefits they bestow on incumbents
and challengers.
On the one hand, reformers argue that incumbents have a disproportion-
ate advantage when it comes to fundraising, so restrictions on contributions
or expenditures are necessary to allow challengers to mount effective cam-
paigns. Like a firm with bountiful marketing resources available to drown
out an upstart competitor’s advertisements, incumbents have such a natural
advantage in fundraising that legal restrictions are necessary to “equalize the
playing field.” At least outside the unique context of corporate and union
electioneering, the Court has specifically and repeatedly rejected such equal-
ization as a legitimate reason for regulating campaign expenditures or con-
tributions.31 Although expressed in classic First Amendment form, the Court
has reasoned that it is impermissible to favor one person’s speech over that of
another. Thus, preventing corruption or its appearance, but not promoting
competition by leveling the electoral playing field, is a permissible interest
for regulating campaign contributions.
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For critics of reform, the political markets approach rears its head in a cri-
tique of the incumbent-protecting effects of campaign finance reform.
Because incumbents, given their name recognition and access to the perks of
office, naturally have an electoral edge, restricting the flow of money into and
out of campaigns places challengers at a distinct disadvantage in getting their
message out.32 In other words, the only way challengers can close the gap be-
tween themselves and incumbents is to raise and spend enormous sums to
achieve name recognition and mobilize their electorate.
This latter argument has found its way into the opinions of Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Consider Justice Scalia’s assessment of
the intentions behind the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which banned
soft money contributions to political parties and corporate and union treas-
ury expenditures on electioneering advertisements:
To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits criticism
of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their reelection
bids. But as everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is
not fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incum-
bents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and
challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incum-
bents are favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of cam-
paign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents
tends to favor incumbents.
. . . . [T]he present legislation targets for prohibition certain cate-
gories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to incum-
bents. Is it accidental, do you think, that incumbents raise about three
times as much “hard money”—the sort of funding generally not
restricted by this legislation—as do their challengers? Or that lobbyists
(who seek the favor of incumbents) give 92 percent of their money in
“hard” contributions? Is it an oversight, do you suppose, that the so-
called “millionaire provisions” raise the contribution limit for a candi-
date running against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as
challengers often do) great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit
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for a candidate running against an individual who devotes to the cam-
paign (as incumbents often do) a massive election “war chest”? And is
it mere happenstance, do you estimate, that national-party funding,
which is severely limited by the Act, is more likely to assist cash-
strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money incumbents?33
This general theory concerning the appropriate suspicion that should be
brought to evaluations of campaign finance reform has not found favor with
the Court’s majority. However, on the specific question whether a campaign
finance reform is appropriately tailored toward combating corruption or its
appearance, the Court pays some lip service to competitiveness concerns. The
Court has promised to strike down contribution limits that prevent a candi-
date from “amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy”34 or
“drive the sound of the candidate’s voice below the level of notice,”35 even if
they are based on genuine intentions to combat corruption. This require-
ment has not proved too difficult for contribution limits to pass. For the most
part, the Court has shown a remarkable level of deference to Congress and
state legislatures in the exercise of their “expertise” concerning the conduct of
campaigns. Far from demonstrating skepticism of politicians’ motives, the
Court’s holdings and reasoning evince a level of trust sometimes even exceed-
ing that brought to bear outside the election law context.36
While the litigation has focused on campaign contribution and expendi-
ture limits, many reformers, recognizing that such regulations of the supply
of money do not affect politicians’ demand, have turned to public financing
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to enhance electoral competition. The most recent empirical study of the
effect of public financing argues: “There is no question that public funding
programs have increased the pool of candidates willing and able to run for
state legislative office. This effect is most pronounced for challengers, who
were far more likely than incumbents to accept public funding. . . . Public
funding appears to have increased the likelihood that an incumbent will have
a competitive race.”37 Although some argue that contribution restrictions also
enhance competition, the fact that we live in an age of both unprecedented
regulation of contributions and unparalleled incumbent reelection rates sug-
gests that such an effect is quite minor. However, public funding programs
vary considerably in the process by which they are funded, the incentives they
provide for participation, the amounts they make available to candidates, and
the restrictions they impose as a tradeoff for participation. They extend from
inadequate programs with low participation to generous schemes with
greater compliance. If public financing does in fact make elections more
competitive, we should expect to see an effect only when such programs are
well enough funded to engender widespread participation.
Regulation of the Primary Electorate
The political markets approach can be expanded beyond general elections
to the regulation of party primary voters and candidates.38 In such cases, the
Court confronts state regulations that seek to tell a party who can and cannot
vote in its primary. Although the Court usually considers these laws from the
standpoint of the party’s associational rights and the right to choose its stan-
dard-bearer, in the background is always the question whether, through reg-
ulation of the primary, one party is attempting to hobble the competitive
position of its opponent.
As with campaign finance, the political markets approach to primary elec-
tion regulation often cuts in opposing directions. On the one hand, just as
one firm ought not be able to dictate the way its competitor can choose its
CEO, so too a party that crafts the nomination rules ought not be able to
structure them in a way that gives it an advantage. On the other hand, party
leaders can capture the nomination process and structure it in a way that
hinders competition in both the primary and general elections. In effect,
party leaders may have a conflict of interest when it comes to regulating their
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membership, thus the Court ought to allow for the membership (for exam-
ple, through a ballot initiative) to check party leaders’ pro-management selec-
tion policies.
Concerns about incumbent entrenchment usually present themselves
when the state (that is, the party controlling the lawmaking process) prevents
a party from opening itself to nonmembers. For example, in the case of
Tashijian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Republican Party wanted to
broaden its base of support by allowing independents to vote in its primary.39
Doing so would presumably lead the party to nominate more moderate nom-
inees (that is, nominees closer to the median voter) who would have a greater
chance of winning general elections. State law, justified on the grounds of
protecting the party from nominating candidates who did not share its mes-
sage, prevented them from doing so. The Court found that the law abridged
the party’s right of expressive association, in part because it distrusted the
“views of the State, which to some extent represent the views of one political
party transiently enjoying majority power.”40
The same concerns animated several opinions in a recent and similar case
involving a challenge by the Libertarian Party to Oklahoma’s law that pre-
vented parties from allowing members of other parties to vote in their pri-
mary.41 Although the majority opinion distinguished Tashijian and upheld
the law, five justices signed on to opinions reflecting some concern about the
potentially anticompetitive effect of this regulation or similar ones in the
future. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence (joined by Justice Breyer)
explained:
Although the State has a legitimate—and indeed critical—role to play in
regulating elections, it must be recognized that it is not a wholly inde-
pendent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is itself controlled by the
political party or parties in power, which presumably have an incentive
to shape the rules of the electoral game to their own benefit. . . . As such
restrictions become more severe, however, and particularly where they
have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for concern that
those in power may be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral
competition. In such cases, applying heightened scrutiny helps to ensure
that such limitations are truly justified and that the State’s asserted
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interests are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive
restrictions.42
Justice Stevens’s dissent (joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) was more
adamant:
It is the [Libertarian Party’s] belief that attracting a more diverse group of
voters in its primary would enable it to select a more mainstream candi-
date who would be more viable in the general election. Like the Republi-
cans in Tashijian, the [Libertarian Party] is cognizant of the fact that in
order to enjoy success at the voting booth it must have support from vot-
ers who identify themselves as independents, Republicans, or Democrats.43
While focusing in general on the expressive associational right of a party
to define the contours of its organization, critics of compelled open primar-
ies also lodge a complaint founded on a political markets theory: namely, that
forcing the party to accept outsiders could also hurt the chances of its nomi-
nee in the general election. In particular, advocates of closed primaries sug-
gest that forcing a party to open its primary could subject it to raiding: that
is, the strategic voting of nonmembers in an opposition party’s primary so as
to nominate a weaker opponent for the general election.44 In theory, forcing
a party to open itself up to a takeover could harm its ability to compete in
elections. However, the empirical support for widespread raiding when pri-
maries are opened up is quite thin.45
Outside the context of race discrimination, the Court has been uniformly
protective of parties’ ability to exclude voters the “state” wants to force into its
primaries.46 For the most part, the opinions in such cases reflect general con-
cerns about parties’ First Amendment right to select their standard-bearer
and to be free from the primary regulations that adulterate the message of the
party membership. When it comes to the parties’ right to include outsiders,
the case law is more mixed. The party has a constitutional right to include
unaffiliated voters but not voters that have registered with another party.47
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The effect of primary voter rules on levels of general election competition
is not well understood; thus the character of a reform agenda founded on
enhancing competition is unclear. I think it is fair to say that most reformers
with such intentions prefer open systems to closed systems on the assump-
tion that more opportunities for voter participation make the emergence of
a quality challenger at some stage more likely, or may provide some incre-
mental potential for accountability through the primary in districts where
the general election is skewed in favor of one party. In addition, political mar-
keteers are naturally suspicious of party leaders whose incentives to keep the
primary “pure” sometimes run contrary to those of a party membership who
might welcome greater choice and access.
Term Limits
The nuclear weapon when it comes to enhancing competition is limiting
the number of terms an individual can serve in office. If one’s measure of the
competitiveness of an electoral system depends on turnover, length of time in
office, or the number of open seats, term limits would appear to be about the
most procompetitive measure a state could adopt. For state offices, state con-
stitutional law governs, and voters acting through direct democracy have suc-
cessfully limited the number of terms one can serve in the state legislature, as
governor, or in any other office.48 For Congress, however, the Court has struck
down term limits as unconstitutional, and quite ironically, it has done so in
the service of preventing incumbent manipulation of qualifications for office.
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court ruled unconstitutional a provi-
sion of the Arkansas constitution that prevented an incumbent member of
Congress from appearing on the ballot if he or she had served a specified
number of terms (two terms for U.S. senators and three terms for members
of the House).49 The Court held that the provisions of the U.S. Constitution
setting forth the qualifications for those offices prevented either Congress or
states from adding qualifications, such as the requirement that one would be
disqualified to serve after a certain time spent in office. Moreover, in a later
case, the Court went even further and struck down a state constitutional pro-
vision that did not limit the number of terms per se, but rather added a bal-
lot notation indicating whether that candidate had supported term limits.50
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In both of these cases the Court noted the intent of the Framers of the
Qualification Clauses that neither state legislatures, nor Congress itself, ought
to be able to limit the types of people who could serve in the federal legisla-
ture. Echoing Madison, the Court explained that “reposing the power to
adopt qualifications in Congress would lead to a self-perpetuating body to
the detriment of the Republic,”51 and citing Hamilton it described the state’s
power to regulate elections as merely a “grant of authority to issue proce-
dural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes,
[or] to favor or disfavor a class of candidates.”52 In other words, the fear that
incumbents might manipulate the qualifications for office to entrench them-
selves or to serve their own interests prevents voters from adopting term lim-
its grounded on the exact same motivation.
This irony was not lost on Justice Thomas, who would have allowed states
to adopt term limits. Pointing to incumbents’ “astonishingly high reelection
rates” due to name recognition, campaign-related perks of office, and bene-
fits with respect to campaign financing, Thomas warned that “current federal
law (enacted, of course, by congressional incumbents) confers numerous
advantages on incumbents, and these advantages are widely thought to make
it significantly more difficult for challengers to defeat them.”53 Installation of
term limits or even the more conservative measure that forces incumbents to
run as write-in candidates after serving a certain number of terms could
counterbalance “the thumb on the . . . scale” that the law otherwise provides
in favor of incumbent reelection. At the very least, argued Thomas, the Qual-
ifications Clause does not force voters to accept as inevitable the possibility
that the incumbency advantage could be so strong as to make elections an
ineffective check on the other legal maneuvers politicians engage in to make
themselves irremovable.
As Cain, Hanley, and Kousser’s contribution to this volume explains, the
effect of term limits on competition has not exactly turned out as advertised.
Quality challengers who previously may have taken a shot at an incumbent,
now often bide their time until a seat becomes open. As a result, elections
throughout an incumbent’s allotted terms may be less competitive, even
though competition in open seats is more frequent and fierce.
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Conclusion 
As the media and reform groups have focused on the problem of safe districts
and uncompetitive elections, so have legal scholars (and to a lesser extent
judges) begun to think about how the Constitution might be viewed as reg-
ulating self-serving moves by incumbents. The solutions—to be found either
in policy or in constitutional law—are not simple. We have become quite
accustomed to thinking about election law controversies as battles between
state interests and individual, associational, or group rights. Shifting focus
toward the background conditions of the political market requires a recon-
ceptualization of the judicial role as political trustbuster with the available
decision-rule in contexts, such as partisan gerrymandering and ballot access,
being no better than declaring that incumbents or the party or parties in
power have gone “too far.” In other arenas, such as campaign finance, the
judicial role would be geared more toward looking into the minds of the
drafters of an election law to see if incumbent or party entrenchment consti-
tuted the true motivation of the law. As difficult as it may be to come up with
administrable election law standards to promote competition, reformers will
continue to view the courts as the most promising agents for “clear[ing] the
channels of political change.”54 The alternative—hoping that those in charge
of the crafting of election laws will become amenable to rules that make their
jobs less secure—has never shown much promise.
References
Cain, Bruce E., and Elisabeth R. Gerber, eds. 2002. Voting at the Political Fault Line: Cal-
ifornia’s Experiment with the Blanket Primary. University of California Press.
Eilperin, Juliet. 2006. Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship Is Poisoning the U.S. House of
Representatives. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Ely, John Hart. 1980. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Garrett, Elizabeth. 1999. “The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Nota-
tions.” Virginia Law Review 85: 1533–87.
———. 2004.“New Issues in the Law of Democracy: Democracy in the Wake of the Cal-
ifornia Recall.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153: 239–84.
Grofman, Bernard, and Gary King. Forthcoming 2006. “Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims after Vieth v. Jubilerer: A Social Science Perspective on Conceptualization and
Measurement.” Election Law Journal.
Hasen, Richard L. 1998. “The ‘Political Market’ Metaphor and Election Law: A Com-
ment on Issacharoff and Pildes.” Stanford Law Review 50: 719–30.
194 NATHANIEL PERSILY
54. Ely (1980, p. 105).
08-5579-1 CH 8  6/25/06  11:00 AM  Page 194
Issacharoff, Samuel. 2000.“Oversight of Regulated Political Markets.” Harvard Journal of
Law and Public Policy 24: 91–100.
———. 2001.“Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Free-
doms, and Partisan Competition.” Columbia Law Review 101: 274–313.
———. 2002. Gerrymandering and Political Cartels. Harvard Law Review 116: 594–648.
———. 2004. “Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics.”
William and Mary Law Review 46: 415–37.
Issacharoff, Samuel, and Richard H. Pildes. 1998. “Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process.” Stanford Law Review 50: 643–717.
Karlan, Pamela S. 1999. “Politics by Other Means.” Virginia Law Review 85: 1697–1724.
Levinson, Daryl J. 1999. “Market Failures and Failures of Markets” Virginia Law Review
85: 1745–59.
Lowenstein, Daniel H. 2000. “The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—And Be
Thankful for Small Favors.” In The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process edited
by David K. Ryden. Georgetown University Press.
Mann, Thomas E., and Bruce E. Cain, eds. 2005. Party Lines: Competition Partisanship
and Congressional Redistricting. Brookings.
Mayer, Kenneth R., Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams. 2005. “Do Public Funding
Programs Enhance Electoral Competition?” Paper presented at the Fourth Annual
Conference on State Politics and Policy Laboratories of Democracy: Public Policy in
the American States, Kent State University. (www.campfin.polisci.wisc.edu/Wisc%
20Camp%20Fin%20Proj%20%20Public%20Funding%20and%20Competition.pdf.)
Persily, Nathaniel. 2001a. “Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Pri-
mary Ballot Access Laws.” Georgetown Law Journal 89: 2181–2225.
———. 2001b. “Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy.” NYU Law
Review 76: 750–824.
———. 2002. “In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquies-
cence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders.” Harvard Law Review 116: 649–81.
Persily, Nathaniel, and Melissa Cully Anderson. 2005. “Regulating Democracy through
Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform.” Southern Cali-
fornia Law Review 78: 997–1034.
Persily, Nathaniel and Bruce E. Cain. 2000. “The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms.” Columbia Law Review100: 775–812.
Pildes, Richard H. 1999.“The Theory of Political Competition.” Virginia Law Review 85:
1605–26.
———. 2004. “Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics.” Harvard
Law Review 118: 28–154.
———. 2006. “The Constitution and Political Competition.” Nova Law Review 30: 269.
Reform Institute. 2005. Beyond Party Lines: Principles for Redistricting Reform. Washington.
COMPETITION IN AMERICAN ELECTION LAW 195
08-5579-1 CH 8  6/25/06  11:00 AM  Page 195
08-5579-1 CH 8  6/25/06  11:00 AM  Page 196
